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“How was a grassroots organization with a limited budget, based in a poor backwater in South Florida, whose members could 
barely afford dietary basics, going to convince corporate executives in suburban Los Angeles to forgo profits by volunteering to 






The Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW) is part of a growing body of labour organizations2 in the 
United States that have abandoned a broken labour law system, and instead, engage in forms of social 
movement activity— public communication, alliance building, and political mobilization—to make gains 
for workers. The most visible of these organizations are worker centres, which now number over 200 
across the country,3 but there are several other types of non-traditional labour organizations as well. 
Traditional unions are also engaging with these strategies; “social movement unionism” and 
“community unionism” are often presented as paths to union revitalization.4 There is, however, 
something qualitatively different between unions that are beneficiaries of the “New Deal” era legal 
reforms,5 and non-traditional labour organizations that are often animated by the absence of these 
protections. Moreover, these organizations seek to serve and organize those that the New Deal compact 
intentionally left out: African-Americans and racialized workers.6 Currently, there is no widely accepted 
way of studying these organizations and their successes and failures. Some favour using traditional 
economic analysis to assess their impact,7 while others stress the sociological aspects of these 
organizations’ work.8 Other scholars prefer to examine the work of these organizations through 
                                                 
1 B Estabrook, Tomatoland: How Modern Industrial Agriculture Destroyed Our Most Alluring Fruit (Kansas City, Andrew McMeel 
Publishing, 2011) 111. 
2 Although the CIW does not identify as a labour organization—it refers to itself as a human rights organization—it is 
analytically useful to categorize it as such because organizations like the CIW point a way forward for the labour movement. 
However,  it is not a “labor organization” for the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935 or the Labor Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 1959.  
3 JR Fine, ‘New Forms to Settle Old Scores: Updating the Worker Centre Story in the United States’ (2011) 66 Relations 
industrielles/ Industrial Relations 604. 
4 See, eg, JF McAlevey, No Shortcuts: Organizing for Power in the New Gilded Age (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016); A 
Tattersall, Power in Coalitions: Strategies for Strong Unions and Social Change (Ithaca, ILR Press, 2010); K Voss and R Sherman, 
‘Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the American Labor Movement’ (2000) 106 American Journal of 
Sociology 303. 
5 See, eg, CL Tomlins, The State and Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
6 See, eg, P Frymer, Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007). 
7 See, eg, KA Elliott and RB Freeman, ‘White Hats or Don Quixotes? Human Rights Vigilantes in the Global Economy’ in RB 
Freeman, J Hersch and L Mishel, eds, Emerging Labor Market Institutions for the Twenty-First Century (Chicago, The University 
of Chicago Press, 2005) 47. 
8 See, eg, CF Rosado Marzán, ‘Worker Centers and the Moral Economy: Disrupting Through Brokerage, Prestige, and Moral 
Framing’ (2018) University of Chicago Legal Forum Art 16. 
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analytical paradigms rooted in governance and regulatory studies.9 Some of the most insightful writing 
on this new face of the labour movement takes a case study approach, which provides rich detail of 
their various functions.10  
 
The CIW is not a traditional labour organization because it does not bargain with employers on 
behalf of its members and it rarely attempts to partner with government agencies to encourage them to 
enforce statutory labour standards. Instead, the CIW has developed a private regulatory system, called 
the Fair Food Program (FFP), which governs labour conditions on tomato farms in Florida. By enlisting 
large corporate entities that purchase tomatoes from Florida—mainly fast food chains and 
supermarkets—to obtain their tomatoes from growers complying with a series of labour standards set 
out in a private code of conduct (Code of Conduct), the CIW has leveraged the enormous buying power 
of entities at the top of the supply chain. The CIW was able to pressure these entities to join the FFP by 
banding together with sympathetic allies and applying social movement pressure to its targets. Pursuing 
similar tactics to the United Farm Workers in the 1960s and 1970s, this pressure came in multiple forms, 
including organizing protest marches, initiating consumer boycotts, demanding the closure of outlets on 
university campuses, and proposing shareholder resolutions designed to embarrass management. Farm 
workers had input in drafting the provisions in the Code of Conduct, and as a result, the Code 
comprehensively regulates conditions such as wages, sexual harassment, and occupational health and 
safety. Most importantly, the FFP requires buyers to pay 1 penny more per pound for all tomatoes 
purchased,11 resulting in a 20-35% wage increase for farm workers.12 Tomato growers have been 
motivated to join the FFP so that they can continue selling their produce to the large corporate buyers 
that are FFP members. In practice, the FFP has proven to be effective because it maintains a strong focus 
on worker education, provides an avenue for workers to complain without fear of reprisal, contains a 
thorough auditing mechanism performed by an institution independent from growers, and applies 
meaningful sanctions on employers that are non-compliant.13  
 
The CIW has received a string of accolades that recognize its success in transforming the working 
conditions of farm workers on Florida’s tomato fields. These include a Global Citizen Award from the 
Clinton Global Initiative in 2014, a Presidential Medal in 2015, and most recently in 2017, a MacArthur 
“Genius” Fellowship for one of its founders, Greg Asbed. The CIW started in 1993 as a loose collective of 
farm workers and advocates who came together with the aim of ending the deteriorating labour 
                                                 
9 See, eg,  M Amengual and J Fine, ‘Co-enforcing Labor Standards: The Unique Contribution of State and Worker Organizations 
in Argentina and the United States’ (2017) 11 Regulation & Governance 129; C Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-
Regulation to Co-Regulation (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2010). 
10 R Milkman and E Ott, eds, New Labor and New York: Precarious Workers and the New Labor Movement (Ithaca, ILR Press, 
2014); R Milkman, J Bloom, and V Harro, eds, Working for Justice: The L.A. Model of Organizing and Advocacy (Ithaca, ILR Press, 
2010); J Fine, Worker Centres: Organizing Communities at the Edge of a Dream (Ithaca, ILR Press, 2006). 
11 Although “one penny more” is the catch cry with which the CIW is most commonly associated, in actual fact, the FFP requires 
growers to pay differing premiums for different types of tomatoes—the premiums range from 1 cent to 4.6 cents more per 
pound of tomato depending on the type of tomato—Interview with S Hitov, General Counsel, Coalition of the Immokalee 
Workers, Washington DC (12 February 2018).   
12 S Greenhouse, ‘In Florida Tomato Fields, a Penny Buys Progress’, New York Times (New York 24 April 2014), 
www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/business/in-florida-tomato-fields-a-penny-buys-progress.html. 
13 See, eg, M Dias-Abey, ‘Justice on our Fields: Can ‘Alt-Labor’ Organizations Improve Migrant Farm Workers’ Conditions’ (2018) 
53 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 167; G Asbed and S Hitov, ‘Preventing Forced Labor in Corporate Supply 
Chains: The Fair Food Program and Worker-Driven Social Responsibility’ (2017) 52 Wake Forest Law Review 497; J Brudney, 
‘Decent Labour Standards in Corporate Supply Chains: The Immokalee Workers Model’ in J Howe and R Owens, eds, Temporary 
Labour Migration in the Global Era: The Regulatory Challenge (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016) 351. 
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conditions of farm workers in Immokalee, Florida. It initially had some success although a broader 
transformation of the labour situation in Florida proved to be elusive—in  the fall of 1995, for example, 
the CIW organized a five-day general strike that managed to reverse a unilateral wage cut implemented 
by one of the largest tomato growers in the area.14 In the span of 25 years, and the CIW had gone from a 
seemingly hopeless political project to one of the United States’ most celebrated new labour 
organizations. This chapter seeks to make sense of the CIW’s remarkable rise by looking back at its 
history and asking how it managed to navigate around quiescent legal institutions, powerful industry 
structures, and an indifferent public.    
 
In order to answer this question, this chapter provides a contextual account of how the CIW  took 
action and why it succeeded, all the while foregrounding the role of law.15 The conventional wisdom is 
that state law offered farm workers in Florida no assistance, so the CIW devised a novel private solution 
(the corollary of this analysis is that we should no longer see state regulation as a terrain of struggle).16 
There are reasons to be critical of this historiography (and the conclusion that it leads to) because we 
can never be entirely be free of law, even when some of the rules that we depend upon fail us. 
Appraising the CIW’s history shows that the law was heavily implicated in its rise because the CIW drew 
heavily on legal discourse and processes at various points. I argue that the CIW relied upon the law, 
broadly understood, in three main ways. First, as significant attention was being devoted to the problem 
of labour trafficking in the national and international arenas in the late 1990s, the CIW was able to 
intervene in public debates and suggest that the most durable solution was to be found in addressing 
deteriorating labour conditions on farms. Second, the CIW made use of public attention on trafficking to 
motivate fast food chains and supermarkets, which were wary of the material and reputational harm 
that was caused by being linked to human rights abuses in their supply chains, to take responsibility for 
farm working conditions. Third, the CIW contributed in several important ways to the federal 
government’s prosecution of crew leaders who engaged in labour trafficking, which conferred a 
measure of social prestige on the CIW and allowed it to convince other actors of its strategy. My 
approach in this chapter is to analyze key moments in the CIW’s history and ask: how were law and legal 
processes involved in the CIW’s strategy for achieving labor rights for farm workers? This question is a 
pertinent one because the risk of eliding the role of law in the CIW’s story is that it limits the full range 
of resources that other labour organizations, hoping to replicate the CIW’s success, may consider 
available. 
 
Narrating the CIW’s history with a view to uncovering the role of law requires a method, and in the 
next section, I outline the theoretical framework that I draw upon: field theory. The section that follows 
                                                 
14 See, eg, SL Marquis, I Am Not a Tractor! How Florida Farmworkers Took on the Fast Food Giants and Won (Ithaca, ILR Press, 
2017), 25-6.  
15 This chapter draws on a case study method to appraise broader transformations in the US labour movement. We can only 
understand how new labour organizations have come to exercise influence by studying important cases in detail. As many have 
noted, the case study method is particularly useful for drawing descriptive inferences, and since our aim is to understand how 
new labour organisations operate, it is an effective methodology. For some key writing on the case study method, see, eg, B 
Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’ (2006) 12 Qualitative Inquiry 219; J Gerring, ‘What is the Case 
Study and What is it Good For?’ (2004) 98 American Political Science Review 341; and RE Skate, The Art of Case Study Research 
(Thousand Oaks, SAGE, 1995).  
16 This analysis, for example, is reflected in Susan Marquis’s book-length treatment of the CIW’s history. Marquis states: “[The 
CIW’s success] …shows the need for, and the power of, novel solutions in those policy areas where the nature of government 
may mean the solution cannot come through government mechanism. Government do many things well, but they cannot solve 
every societal problem.”—Marquis, I Am Not A Tractor, 222 (n 14). 
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examines how the CIW operated in five key fields—the labour relations field, the anti-trafficking field, 
the fast food field, the supermarket field, and the tomato industry field—and how it drew upon the 
discursive and symbolic power of law in each of these arenas. The final section analyses how the law 
undergirded the CIW’s strategy at crucial moments. I conclude this chapter with some brief comments 
about how labour organizations may be able to draw on the law to achieve their objectives.  
 
II.  FIELD THEORY TO MAKE SENSE OF THE SPRAWL OF HISTORY  
 
There are many ways to tell the story of the CIW’s emergence from a position of relative weakness 
to one of strength. The approach I take in this chapter is to describe how the CIW purposefully 
interacted with key actors, setting in motion a series of interconnected events, which had the outcome 
of creating a new system of labour governance for farm workers in Florida.17 My objective is to set out a 
historical narrative that draws out relevant insights about how labour organizations, armed with 
imagination and resolution, can transform the dynamics of labour relations in particular industries. I 
make use of an important theoretical tool from the discipline of sociology—field analysis—to achieve 
this end.  
 
Field analysis is a popular analytical framework and methodological tool that seeks to explain social 
action by focusing on meso-level domains in which actors orient their actions to each other.18 It is a way 
of understanding the social world, which in the words of Pierre Bourdieu, “thinks in terms of relations.”19 
Moreover, it is also a technique that can be applied to particular empirical situations to trace the chain 
of casual connections that constitute social action. I draw particularly on a variant of field analysis 
pioneered by sociologists Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam, which explains the problematics of collective 
action by synthesizing insights from the social movement, economic sociology and organizational theory 
literatures.20 While relying primarily on Fligstein and McAdam’s model of fields—which they call 
“strategic action fields” to emphasise the agency of actors and contingency of behaviour that creates 
social transformation—I also rely on the work of a number of other scholars who have developed 
Fligstein and McAdam’s  conceptual apparatus to better understand change in the social world.21 It is 
necessary to explicate some of its key features before I can proceed to apply this analytical framework 
to the situation of the CIW. 
 
                                                 
17 To reconstruct this socio-legal historiography, I have used a variety of techniques, including, reviewing archival material (old 
newspaper articles, campaign pamphlets, transcripts of public hearings etc), reading secondary material written on the CIW, 
and conducting semi-structured interviews with key players in the organization (Laura Germino (co-founder of the CIW and 
mainly responsible for the CIW’s anti-trafficking work), Steve Hitov (CIW’s General Counsel), and Sean Sellers (formerly of the 
Fair Food Standards Council and Student/Farmworker Alliance)).  
18 See, eg, P Gastón, ‘Contention Across Social Fields: Manipulating the Boundaries of Labor Struggle in the Workplace, 
Community and Market’ (2018) 65 Social Problems 231; E Barman, ‘Varieties of Field Theory and the Sociology of the Non-Profit 
Sector’ (2016) 10 Sociology Compass 442; N Fligstein and D McAdam, A Theory of Fields (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012); 
JL Martin, ‘What is Field Theory?’ (2003) 109 American Journal of Sociology 1; P Bourdieu and LJD Wacquant, An Invitation to 
Reflexive Sociology (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992), 94. 
19 Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 96 (n 18).  
20 Fligstein and McAdam, A Theory of Fields (n 18).  
21 I am less interested in Bourdieu’s conception since it is focused more on the reproduction of fields than change that occurs 
within them—for a critical discussion of Bourdieu’s contribution to field theory, see especially, C Calhoun, ‘Habitus, Field, and 
Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity’ in C Calhoun, E LiPuma and M Postone, Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1999) 61. 
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Turning first to providing a working definition of a field: it is an arena of social life where individual 
and collective actors struggle for control while sharing an understanding of what is at stake.22 The stakes 
in a field include the purpose of the field, the relationship between actors, and the rules regulating 
acceptable behaviour.23 Ultimately, determining whether a field exists is an empirical matter to 
resolve.24 This chapter explains the CIW’s rise through the operation of five distinct, but overlapping, 
fields: a labour relations field, an anti-trafficking field, a fast food field, a supermarket field, and a 
tomato industry field. It is possible to describe each of these as distinct fields because they contain 
actors who vie for supremacy within each of these arenas while being aware of each other and 
operating in accordance with rules understood by them. These fields are overlapping because certain 
actors are concurrently prominent players in a number of fields. The fact that the fields are overlapping 
means that shifts in one can reverberate across others and create system-wide changes.    
 
A set of common understandings and rules govern fields. The common understandings include the 
purpose of the field, the distribution of power and resources between parties, and expectations about 
how each other should behave.25 We can think of these rules as a complex amalgam of norms, practices 
and processes that are supported by power and legitimacy.26 While formal, written law is an important 
aspect of the field’s governance, legal and cultural logics interact in numerous ways, including in 
determining how written laws are operationalized in a particular field. As a number of socio-legal 
scholars have pointed out, the law is not only a tool of domination, but under the right conditions, can 
be utilized instrumentally by less powerful actors.27   While these common understandings and rules are 
not static, they are often durable.  
 
As Fligstein and McAdam point out, shared understandings do not indicate that the actors see the 
distribution of power and resources within the field as legitimate.28 Contention is a central aspect of 
fields because actors take individual and collective action to disrupt fields and change the power 
relations within them. Incumbents, usually endowed with greater resources and interpretive frames that 
favour the status quo, will succeed in having their dominant position reaffirmed. However, challengers 
can, and often do, manage to shift fields in alternative directions. Field analysis is, at its heart, a theory 
of social change. While field members have a fairly wide degree of latitude to act in ways that benefit 
them, their structural positions within the field and the accepted rules of the field often constrain their 
agency.   
 
Even the most stable fields do not remain stable forever. The most common way for change to take 
place within a field is as a result of an exogenous shock emanating from another since weaker actors will 
not find it easy to overcome the structural limitations engendered by their positions.29 According to 
                                                 
22 Fligstein and McAdam, A Theory of Fields (n 18). 
23 Ibid, 9. 
24 Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 100 (n 18).  
25 Fligstein and McAdam, A Theory of Fields (n 18). 
26 S Falk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study’ (1973) 7 Law & 
Society Review 719.  
27 The literature on how weaker parties in society mobilise law in aid of their objectives is large. For some key sources, see 
especially GN Rosenberg, The Hallow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 2nd ed (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 2008); SA Scheingold, The Politics of Rights, 2nd ed (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2004); and M McCann, 
Rights at Work: Pay Equity and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994).  
28 Fligstein and McAdam, A Theory of Fields, 170 (n 18). 
29 Ibid. 
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Fligstein and McAdam, an exogenous shock can take one of three forms: (1) entry into a field by external 
parties; (2) changes in a related field; or (3) through the occurrence of large and impactful events which 
create momentary crises.30 This means that field changes occur as a result of something that comes 
from the outside. Pablo Gaston argues that the exogenous shock explanation of change does not 
account sufficiently for actors’ agency—he finds that actors can actively manipulate the situation in one 
field with the objective of creating change in another (which Gaston calls “cross-field manipulation”).31 
Both dynamics—exogenous shock and intentional cross-field manipulation—are evident in the story of 
the CIW. 
 
III. THE RISE OF THE CIW 
 
A. Challenging labour relations in Florida 
 
The actors in the Florida labour relations field include tomato growers, farm workers, government 
bodies, and civil society actors. These actors are involved in determining how tomato farmers should 
engage with their workers. The government bodies include federal agencies that enforce various 
workplace standards (e.g. Wage & Hours Division and the Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration).32 The National Labour Relations Board, which should be a key player in the labour 
relations field, does not feature prominently with respect to farm workers because the National Labor 
Relations Act, 1935, does not cover agricultural employees.33 Farm workers in Florida rely heavily on 
legal service providers and farm worker advocacy organizations, and as a result, these organizations are 
important players in the Florida labour relations field. 
 
Prior to the implementation of the FFP, agricultural employers behaved as though they believed 
that the rights of farm workers could be violated with impunity, and government bodies did very little to 
dissuade them of this belief.34 While employers must abide by the limited federal and state workplace 
regulations that apply to them—limited because farm workers are not covered by significant parts of the 
federal Labor Standards Act, 1938—35 many employers do not comply because the risk of being caught 
by overburdened field officers is low.36 Farming interests in the state have continued to exercise an 
outsized influence to ensure that statutory workplace standards will not be strengthened nor 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Gastón, ‘Contention Across Social Fields’ (n 18). 
32 Government bodies in Florida only play a marginal role because there is no state department of labor (it was abolished in the 
early 2000s). While the State Attorney General has some oversight functions, she has mostly been inactive in enforcing labour 
standards—S Woodman, ‘Florida Has Not Held an Employer Responsible for Violating the Minimum Wage Since 2011’, The 
Nation (New York 11 July 2016), www.thenation.com/article/florida-has-not-held-an-employer-responsible-for-violating-the-
minimum-wage-since-2011/.  
33National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC § 152 (3). 
34 While wage theft is rife in Florida and farm workers are particularly affected—see C Hernandez, Wage Theft in Florida: A Real 
Problem with Real Solutions (Research Institute on Social and Economic Policy, 2010), acwttf.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/fact-
sheet-wt-report.pdf.  
35 M Linder, ‘Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal’ (1986-7) 65 Texas Law 
Review 1335. 
36 On the general dearth of federal labour inspectors, see, eg, M Dietz, D Levitt and E Love, ‘Enforcement of Labor Standards’ in 
M Reich, K Jacobs and M Dietz, eds, When Mandates Work: Raising Labor Standards at the Local Level (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 2014) 229. On the limitations of federal labour enforcement in Florida in particular, see, eg, R Greene, 
‘Advocates Don’t Feel Labor Department is Ally’, The Miami Herald (Miami 2 September 2003).  
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enforcement intensified,37 and farm labour advocates who attempt to undertake private enforcement to 
fill the gap left by public regulators face a Sisyphean task. Of course, workers and their advocates do not 
share the view that their labour rights are violable, but their lack of power within the labour relations 
field means that they must often acquiesce.  
 
Even among farm labour advocates, significant differences exist. The conflicts between two farm 
worker advocacy organizations—the CIW and the Migrant Farmworker Justice Project (MFJP)38 —about 
the correct strategy to assist farm workers reveal that shared understandings are contested from 
multiple angles. MFJP, which is a part of Florida Legal Services, is a legal aid provider that assists low-
wage and vulnerable farm workers. MFJP services the farm worker population by trying to gain the 
attention of public labour inspectorates, or by filing private legal suits, sometimes in the form of class 
actions, to achieve legal remedies for its clients. For many years before the FFP commenced operation, 
the prevalent mode of contesting labour relations was to file private legal suits to achieve redress for 
individual workers who had experienced wage theft. In fact, two of the CIW’s founders, Greg Asbed and 
Laura Germino, started their careers working as paralegals for a similar legal service provider, Florida 
Rural Legal Services.39 Their frustration with the lack of impact of legal advocacy prompted Asbed and 
Germino, together with other members of the CIW, to devise the FFP. As the FFP started to become 
more prominent, tensions between the MFJP and CIW began to increase. Members of the MFJP 
questioned the effectiveness of the CIW’s approach, going so far as to disparage the motivations of the 
group’s leadership.40 To understand how the CIW’s vision of field transformation won out, it is necessary 
to examine nearby fields.  
 
B. A proximate anti-trafficking field 
 
As the issue of trafficking started to gain more traction in the 1990s, a national anti-trafficking field 
began to cohere and the CIW played a key role in this process. I argue that the CIW was able to 
strategically utilize prevalent discourses in this field to draw attention to the issue of farm working 
conditions in Florida where forced labour appeared to thrive. Equally important, I contend that the CIW 
was able to intervene into the public debate and argue that the problem of human trafficking could not 
be solved with additional prosecutions and harsher penalties, but that it required a preventative 
approach, which meant empowering workers and improving labour standards in industries affected by 
trafficking. 
 
An anti-trafficking field had existed in the United States for many decades, primarily made up of 
federal and state authorities responsible for enforcing the patchwork of legal prohibitions on the books 
against slavery, forced labour, peonage, human smuggling and aggravated sexual assault.41 At the CIW’s 
instigation, the anti-trafficking field, which had previously ignored the issue of forced labour, started to 
turn its attention to the problem of modern-day slavery on Florida’s farms. In 1992, the CIW discovered 
                                                 
37 Farming groups, such as the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association, have been powerful advocates for the interests of farm 
employers, with influence in Washington and the state legislature since the 1940s—see, eg, C Hahamovitch, No Man’s Land 
Jamaican Guestworkers in America and the Global History of Deportable Labor (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011), 94. 
38 Recently renamed the Immigrant & Migrant Rights Project. 
39 Marquis, I Am Not A Tractor, 10 (n 14). 
40 Coalition of Immokalee Workers, Special Comment on the Lawsuit Filed Recently Against Burger King, ciw-
online.org/blog/2011/09/florida-legal-services-lawsuit/. 
41 JM Chacón, ‘Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking’ (2006) 74 Fordham 
Law Review 2977. 
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the existence of a trafficking operation through its contact with farm workers.42 It started to investigate 
the matter when the US Department of Justice and the FBI initially showed limited interest, and it 
continued gathering information and collecting evidence for five years, even after law enforcement 
authorities became involved.43 In 1997, after a lengthy trial, a crew leader and his associate were found 
guilty of 25 counts of enslavement, extortion, immigration and labour violations and were sentenced to 
15 years in prison.44 While the case was successfully prosecuted by the federal Department of Justice, it 
was brought only after the CIW discovered the existence of the operation, applied pressure to 
prosecute, and provided vital evidence gathered through its own investigations.45 Between 1997 and 
2010, there were nine prosecutions involving forced labour on Florida’s farms and the CIW participated 
in some way in most of them.46 The horrors uncovered by these prosecutions prompted government 
officials to label Florida the “ground zero for modern day slavery.”47 In one particularly egregious case, 
Miguel Flores and Sebastian Gomez were found to have kept a workforce of some 400 men and women, 
mostly indigenous Mexicans and Guatemalans, under armed guard and compelled them to work 10-12 
each day harvesting tomatoes, six days per week, for as little as $20 per week.48 As a result of these 
prosecutions, law enforcement authorities released more than 1,000 workers held captive.49 These 
cases received significant coverage by the media, with stories placed prominently in publications such as 
the St. Petersburg Times, Washington Post and the New York Times.50  
 
At the turn of the century, the anti-trafficking field began to consider the enactment of specific 
legislation to facilitate greater prosecution of this conduct. Concurrently, spurred by a desire to tackle 
transnational crime, the international community was engaged with the negotiation of a Trafficking 
Protocol under the auspices of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.51 While the international 
and national efforts mostly developed along parallel tracks, their paths frequently crossed. The US 
Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 200052 (TPVA) on 28 October 2000 amid an 
extraordinary amount of attention on the issue of human trafficking in the preceding decade. The TPVA 
                                                 
42 Marquis, I Am Not A Tractor, 37-45 (n 14). 
43 Ibid.  
44 Department of Justice, ‘Media Release: Miguel Flores and Associates Sentenced to 15 Years for Enslaving Migrant Workers’ 
(Washington DC 14 November 1997), www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/1997/November97/482cr.htm.html.  
45 Tom Perez, then at the Department of Justice, appointed Luis Cabeza deBaca, a civil rights prosecutor, to take charge of the 
case. This was one of deBaca’s early forced labour cases. In 2009, deBaca was appointed Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and 
Combat Trafficking in Persons by President Obama—Hitov, Interview (n 11).  
46 Due to the CIW’s trusted status within the migrant farmworker community, it was able to receive information from workers 
and pass it on to the authorities as well as provide support and reassurance to affected workers so that they could testify 
against their abusers. On occasion, the CIW also went undercover to gather evidence. See, eg, Absed and Hitov, ‘Preventing 
Forced Labor in Corporate Supply Chains above’, 502-4 (n 13). 
47 J Bowe, ‘Nobodies: Does Slavery Exist in America?’, The New Yorker (New York 21 April 2003), 
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/04/21/nobodies.  
48 S Sellers and G Asbed, ‘The History and Evolution of Forced Labor in Florida Agriculture’ (2011) 5 Race/Ethnicity: 
Multidisciplinary Global Contexts 29. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See, eg, E Scholosser, ‘A Side Order of Human Rights’, New York Times (New York 6 April 2005), 
www.nytimes.com/2005/04/06/opinion/a-side-order-of-human-rights.html?; B Broadway, ‘Churches Back Boycotts Over 
Migrant Workers; Labor Unions Decry Treatment by Taco Bell, Mt. Olive Suppliers’, The Washington Post (Washington  DC 22 
November 2003); and B Maxwell, ‘Slavery Alive in Florida’s Agricultural Industry’, St Petersburg Times (St Petersburg 3 July 
2002). 
51 Which became A Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, UNTS 2237, 319.  
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advanced a number of preventative measures, created new offences and increased penalties to aid 
prosecutions, as well as providing for the protection of victims (e.g. by the creation of a special T-visa for 
trafficked victims).53 The CIW was involved in the TPVA’s conception, drafting and enactment.54 
Although President Bill Clinton signed the TPVA into law, the subsequent administration of George W. 
Bush, keen to define “compassionate conservativism,” also expressed enthusiastic support.55 Some have 
argued that genuine concern for the plight of trafficked victims intersected with the United States’ post-
September 11 preoccupation with securing its border with Mexico to create the perfect storm for a 
legislative intervention.56 Others have pointed out that the national anti-trafficking discussion also relied 
upon anxieties about gender and sexuality.57  
 
The passage of the TPVA saw a three-fold increase in the number of prosecutions undertaken by 
federal authorities,58 with the then-Attorney General, John Ashcroft, announcing in 2001 that fighting 
trafficking would be a major priority for the Department of Justice.59 The CIW made use of the national 
attention to make a compelling case for why the solution to the problem—at least with respect to 
forced labour—lay in improving the labour conditions of farm workers. Both the TPVA and Trafficking 
Protocol take a criminal law approach to the issue of labour trafficking, which sees trafficking as an 
exceptional occurrence that must be treated with penal sanction. On the other hand, the CIW saw 
forced labour on farms as driven by poverty and powerlessness, and therefore, advocated what labour 
law scholars such as Hila Shamir call a “labour approach,” which treats trafficking as a problem to be 
solved by transforming the underlying structure of labour markets.60 Shamir’s point is that in 
circumstances where work has become so degraded, unscrupulous traffickers are bound to act 
opportunistically. The labour approach sees trafficking as existing on a continuum: one end is 
characterized by low pay, dangerous working conditions, and limited worker power to seek remedies, 
and the other end, by workers forced to perform work under compulsion.61 The CIW proposal to stamp 
out slavery in Florida was to transform the working conditions on fields growing one of Florida’s major 
crops, tomatoes. This attitude characterized the CIW’s approach right from the outset—as early as 2002, 
Germino, one of the CIW’s founders, argued that, “the solution…[to labour trafficking]…is attacking the 
root causes and modernizing agricultural labor relations so workers have more power.”62  
 
Uniquely, the CIW also saw that if major purchasers of Florida’s tomatoes could drive down prices 
through large volume purchases, then these same entities could also motivate farmers to eliminate 
                                                 
53 H Shamir, ‘A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking’ (2012) 60 UCLA Law Review 76. 
54 Interview with L Germino, Founding Member, Coalition of Immokalee Workers, by phone (15 May 2018). See also, K Bales 
and R Soodalter, The Slave Next Door (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2009), Ch 3. 
55 W Chapkis, ‘Soft Glove, Punishing Fist: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act 2000’ in E Bernstein and L Schaffner, eds, 
Regulating Sex: The Politics of Intimacy and Identity (New York, Routledge, 2005) 51, 59. 
56N Sharma, ‘Anti-Trafficking Rhetoric and the Making of Global Apartheid’ (2005) 17 NWSA Journal 88. 
57 Chapkis, ‘Soft Glove, Punishing Fist’ (n 55). 
58 Florida State University Center for the Advancement of Human Rights, Florida Responds to Human Trafficking (2003), 25, 
www.northeastern.edu/humantrafficking/wp-content/uploads/Florida_Responds_to_Human_Trafficking.pdf. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Shamir, ‘A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking’ (n 53). 
61 Ibid. The continuum approach also accords with how workers subjectively experience coercion along a spectrum—D Brennan, 
‘Subjectivity of Coercion: Workers’ Experiences with Trafficking in the United States’ in P Kotiswaran, ed, Revisiting the Law and 
Governance of Trafficking, Forced Labor and Modern Slavery (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017) 134.  
62 M Maidenberg, ‘Florida Employers Guilty of Slavery’, LaborNotes (31 July 2002), www.labornotes.org/2002/07/florida-
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forced labour.63 Although the ultimate beneficiaries of forced labour were almost always larger 
businesses that purchased farmers’ tomatoes, none were ever prosecuted.64 Brandishing posters and 
placards featuring phrases, such as “Taco Bell makes farm workers poor” and “From the hands of a 
slave”, the CIW made the public case for why fast food chains and supermarkets should be held 
responsible for failing to eradicate forced labour in their supply chains. The CIW was engaged in what 
the social movement literature calls “reframing”, which explains how actors present their vision for 
transformation in a way that is culturally resonant and socially convincing.65 Sally Merry Engle reminds 
us that “frames themselves are not ideas but ways of packaging and presenting ideas that generate 
shared beliefs, motivate collective action, and define appropriate strategies for action.”66 The CIW was 
able to draw on the national attention on combatting trafficking, together with the growing recognition 
that the agricultural sector in Florida was a site of forced labour, to give force to its claim for improving 
labour conditions.67 Moreover, they had a convincing proposal for the means to achieve the elimination 
of forced labour on Florida’s farms.  
 
C. Taking the fight to the fast food companies 
 
Even though the CIW proposed a labour approach to the problem of human trafficking, it was clear 
for the CIW that pursuing the growers alone was not a feasible strategy for changing the working 
conditions on farms. Growers were facing increasing pressure from the purchasing practices of 
consolidated buyers. The unique insight of the CIW was that the real power to change labour conditions 
on farms lay with one of the big purchasers of Florida’s tomatoes: the fast food chains. With the eating 
habits of Americans changing in recent decades, the food services sector (in which fast food is the 
biggest player) consumes a growing share of the tomatoes consumed.68 By purchasing large volumes, 
fast food companies can dictate prices, product quality and a variety of other conditions; Yum 
Restaurants!, McDonalds, Burger King and a handful of other operators have the power to shape entire 
fresh produce sectors.69 These companies depend upon Florida for its field tomatoes because Florida 
supplies close to 90% of America’s needs during the winter months.70 Based on its understanding of the 
structure of the tomato and fast food industries, and Florida’s unique position as a major fresh produce 
supplier, the CIW decided to hold fast food companies responsible for farm working conditions. We can 
                                                 
63 Maquis, I am not a Tractor!, 45 (n 14). This analysis is also shared by scholars who study the US tomato value chain—see, eg, 
G Gereffi et al, “US-Based Food and Agricultural Value Chains and Their Relevance to Healthy Diets” (2009) 4 Journal of Hunger 
& Environmental Nutrition 357.  
64 Testimony of Charlie Frost, Detective, Collier County Sherriff’s Office at the Hearing of the Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions, ‘Examining Ending Abuses and Improving Working Conditions for Tomato Workers’, Senate Hearing 110-
889 (15 April 2008). 
65 S Engle Merry, Human Rights & Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice (Chicago, Chicago University 
Press, 2006), Ch5; DA Snow et al, ‘Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation’ (1986) 51 
American Sociological Review 464. 
66 Merry, Human Rights & Gender Violence, 136 (n 65). 
67 The labour standards contained in the FFP are particularly effective in addressing labour trafficking. For example, the use of 
labour intermediaries is a major factor in the incidence of forced labour in domestic supply chains, and the FFP bans the use of 
labour contractors—see A Crane et al, “Governance Gaps in Eradicating Forced Labor: From Global to Domestic Supply Chains” 
(2017) Regulation & Governance (early access), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/rego.12162. 
68 Oxfam America, Like Machines in the Field: Workers Without Rights in American Agriculture (March 2004), 28, 
www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/like-machines-in-the-fields.pdf.  
69 Ibid. 
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consider the dense network of horizontal and vertical relationships of production and exchange 
between tomato producers, fast food companies, and consumers, as constituting a fast food field.  
 
The CIW first targeted the fast food giant, Taco Bell, in 2000 by asking it to pay one penny more for 
each pound of round tomatoes purchased from Florida’s farmers.71 Taco Bell was an obvious choice of 
target because of its associations with Mexican culture—its mascot is the iconic talking Chihuahua who 
exclaims in Spanish, “Yo Quiero Taco Bell!” (I want Taco Bell!).72 At first, Taco Bell was unwilling to agree 
to the CIW’s terms, citing the fact that the working conditions of its suppliers had little to do with the 
company. After a grueling five-year campaign, Yum! Foods (which owned the Taco Bell chain) eventually 
capitulated. After further campaigning, the CIW was able to pressure McDonalds in 2007 to agree to its 
terms. Burger King and Subway followed suit in 2008 and Chipotle and Mexican Grill signed in 2012. 
Wendy’s is the last of the five major fast food corporations that have not joined the FFP and it is still (as 
of June 2018) the target of a wide-ranging campaign. The tactics that the CIW employed in its campaigns 
against the fast food companies included organizing protest marches, calling for boycotts, staging 
hunger strikes, and proposing resolutions at shareholder meetings to pressure management. The 
boycotts, in particular, proved to be a potent tool in the modern era because of their ability to disrupt 
contemporary forms of capitalism, which Stuart Hall has argued is increasingly mediated by cultural 
meaning and knowledge.73  
 
The CIW confronted these powerful corporations with sympathetic allies by its side, such as 
churches and student groups.74 Students, for example, ran campaigns at close to 300 colleges, resulting 
in 25 schools, colleges and universities either removing or preventing new Taco Bell restaurants from 
opening, or ending existing sponsorship agreements with the company.75 The campaigns that the CIW 
waged from 2005 against the fast food sector contained two ingredients that social movement scholars 
have highlighted as essential to successful social change: repertoires of contention that are broad, 
creative and impactful, and solidarity from networks of allies.76 
 
Why did fast food companies ultimately bow to social movement pressure from the CIW and its 
allies? One reason is that the CIW ran a campaign that caused tangible commercial damage.77 A 
company executive at Compass Group (a food service company), which signed on to the FFP in 2009, 
admitted in a rare moment of candour that the reason for the company’s acquiescence was the 
disruption that the CIW threatened to its university operations.78 We can only speculate about other 
motivations. Generally, an important reason why companies agree to social movement demands is fear 
                                                 
71 Taco Bell is owned by Yum Restaurants!, which also owns Pizza Hut, KFC, A&W and a number of other fast food brands. 
72 Marquis, I am not a Tractor!, 54 ( n 15).  
73 S Hall, ‘Brave New World’ (October 1988) Marxism Today 24.  
74 J Lo and A Jacobson, ‘Human Rights from Field to Fork: Improving Labor Conditions for Food-Sector Workers by Organizing 
Across Boundaries’ (2011) 5 Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts 61. 
75 D Campbell, ‘Taco’s Tomato Pickers on Slave Wages’, The Guardian (London 17 March 2003), 
www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/17/usa.duncancampbell. 
76 See, eg, S Tarrow, Power in Movements, 3rd ed (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
77 University campaigns succeeded in either removing existing or preventing new Taco Bell restaurants opening on 23 
campuses. On Boise State University, the campaign prevented Taco Bell obtaining naming rights to a basketball stadium—see 
Marquis, I Am Not a Tractor!, 64 (n 14). 
78 C Queen, Address delivered at the 2015 United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights, 18 November 2015, www.ciw-
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of the damage that might be caused to their carefully cultivated brands.79 This seems particularly 
apposite in the case of fast food companies, which value highly their reputations. The CIW’s campaign 
also came at an opportune time. In the closing decades of the 20th century, public opinion seemed to be 
turning against fast food. The libel case that McDonalds brought against two Greenpeace activists in 
1990 turned out be a public relations disaster because it showed the corporate chicanery necessary to 
maintain its public image.80 In 2004, the premier of Morgan Spurlock’s documentary, “Super Size Me,” 
brought further bad publicity. The CIW’s strategically called boycotts came at a time of unprecedented 
interest in the fast food sector‘s impacts on people’s health, the environment, and animal rights. The 
CIW capitalized on the fast food sector’s momentary weakness to draw attention to working conditions 
in its supply chains. It used the incidence of forced labour uncovered through the anti-trafficking 
prosecutions to further dramatize the situation. 
 
D. Supermarkets join the Fair Food Program   
 
Besides fast food corporations, the other major customers of Florida’s tomatoes are supermarkets. 
In 2008, Whole Foods voluntarily joined the FFP. Aimed at a niche upwardly mobile urban market, 
Wholefoods seeks to distinguish itself on the basis of product quality, just treatment of animals, and 
environmentally sustainable practices. Its decision to join the FFP can be attributed to growing 
awareness about labour issues in products’ supply chains, the often forgotten pillar of ethical 
consumption.81 Walmart’s accession to the FFP in 2014 was more surprising, and potentially more 
transformative because Walmart also agreed to apply the FFP to its tomato growers in Georgia, South 
Carolina and Virginia, in addition to its strawberry and apple suppliers.82 But what motivated Walmart, a 
company that labour historian Nelson Lichtenstein has described as possessing a “militant hostility to 
trade unionism,”83 to join a program aimed at improving the lot of farm workers? 
 
Some context is important to understand the evolving relationship between the FFP and prominent 
supermarket companies.84 After World War II, the number of supermarkets in the United States 
exploded, transforming the way that Americans receive their food. It is estimated that 40,000 
supermarkets (conventional supermarkets and “hypermarkets” like the Walmart SuperCenters) are 
located around the country.85 In the 1990s, there was a massive wave of consolidation in the industry 
                                                 
79 Elliott and Freeman, ‘White Hats or Don Quixotes?’ (n 7). Cf. Tim Bartley and Curtis Child did not find that anti-sweatshop 
campaigns had a discernible impact on firms’ reputations— T Bartley and C Child, ‘Movements, Markets and Fields: The Effects 
of Anti-Sweatshop Campaigns on U.S. Firms, 1993-2000’ (2011) 90 Social Forces 425. 
80 E Scholosser, Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Dream (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001), 245-9. 
81 For example, Whole Foods announced in 2015 that it would no long source products from suppliers that use prison labour—S 
Shemkus, ‘Beyond Cheap Labor: Can Prison Work Programs Benefit Inmates?’, The Guardian (London 9 December 2015), 
www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/dec/09/prison-work-program-ohsa-whole-foods-inmate-labor-incarceration.  
82 G Gilbert, “The Coalition of Immokalee Workers Takes Aim at Wendy’s”, In These Times (Chicago 2 March 2015), 
inthesetimes.com/working/entry/17701/coalition_of_immokalee_workers_wendys. 
83 Nelson Lichtenstein describes in great detail the extreme steps taken by Walmart to defeat unionization efforts among its 
distribution and retail workers— N Lichtenstein, The Retail Revolution: How Wal-Mart Created a Brave New World of Business 
(New York, Metropolitan Books, 2009), Ch 5.   
84 The following supermarket chains are members of the FFP (indicates when they joined): Whole Foods Markets (2008), Trader 
Joe’s (2012), Walmart (2014), Fresh Market (2015), and Ahold USA (2015).  
85 FoodIndustry.com, How Many Grocery Stores are in the United States?, www.foodindustry.com/articles/how-many-grocery-
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and locally-based chains gave way to large regionally-based and national monoliths.86 Many of these 
consolidations were in response to Walmart’s entry into the supermarket business and its rapid growth. 
Through a combination of bringing logistics such as purchasing, warehousing, distribution and trucking 
in-house, using technological innovations to meticulously gather data on sales, keeping labour costs low, 
and leveraging its large purchasing volumes to obtain cheap prices from its suppliers, Walmart came to 
dominate the American retail sector more generally, and food retailing in particular.87 Walmart now 
accounts for almost one-quarter to one-third of all grocery sales in the United States.88 Within the 
supermarket field, which is made up of these regionally and nationally-based supermarket chains and 
their suppliers, there is fierce competition. This competition means that supermarkets compete on the 
basis of price, quality and diversity.89 According to Jason Konefal and his colleagues, the range and 
quality of fresh produce has become an especially important field of battle, and retailers have moved to 
using private labels as a way to “advertise the quality of their products, but also to further diversify the 
marketplace for food and develop new market niches.”90  
 
With this background in mind, it is possible to posit four hypotheses as to why Walmart joined the 
FFP. The most obvious explanation is that the FFP offered a relatively inexpensive way for Walmart to 
launder its reputation. Charity has long been a part of corporate public relations strategy, which likely 
explains why Walmart controls one of the country’s largest philanthropy foundations.91 Second, 
Walmart’s “just-in-time” procurement practices means that it has little room for disruptions in its supply 
chains. Labour strife on farms can cause disruption, and thus, from Walmart’s perspective, pacifying 
workers with a relatively small increase in wages might have provided it with a way to insure against this 
risk.92 Third, joining the FFP might have offered Walmart with an opportunity to appease a growing 
segment of its consumer base that is no longer primarily motivated by price alone.93 The fourth, and 
perhaps most intriguing hypothesis is that the prevalence of forced labour on farms was a situation that 
Walmart’s management could no longer countenance. Bethany Moreton has shown how Evangelical 
Christianity was strategically invoked at several points in Walmart’s past to further its corporate 
strategy, and the existence of force labour in its supply chains likely contradicted Walmart’s professed 
piety.94 In all likelihood, the real attraction of the FFP was a combination of factors— while eliminating 
the risk of disruption in its supply chain, the FFP allowed Walmart to burnish its Christian credentials and 
also appeal to a portion of its customers that cares about ethical consumption.   
 
E. Tomato industry field 
 
                                                 
86 J Konefal et al, ‘Supermarkets and Supply Chains in North America’ in D Burch and G Lawrence, eds, Supermarkets and the 
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87 Lichtenstein, The Retail Revolution (n 83). 
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Ethics and Economics of Agrifood Competition (Dordrecht, Springer, 2013) 99. 
89 Konefal et al, ‘Supermarkets and Supply Chains in North America’ (n 86). 
90 Ibid, 278. 
91 Lichtenstein, The Retail Revolution, 209-15 (n 83). 
92 A sub-field called supply chain risk management provides important insights for companies seeking to manage a variety of 
risks in their supply chains (environmental, industrial, organizational etc)—see, eg, W Ho et al, ‘Supply Chain Risk Management: 
A Literature Review’ (2015) 53 International Journal of Production Research 5031.   
93 Walmart has recently launched a range of organic products under its Great Value store brand—J Sturgeon, ‘Organic Groceries 
Go Discount as Walmart Canada Rolls Out New Label’, Global News (Toronto 15 December 2015), 
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The growing number of fast food and supermarket companies joining the FFP could not make 
improvements for workers until the CIW obtained the cooperation of the growers to implement the 
conditions of employment set out in the Code of Conduct and to pass on the wage premium to workers. 
Growers were initially wary of the FFP for two main reasons. First, even though the wage premium was 
being provided by buyers further upstream, growers would still incur some costs to implement some of 
the FFP’s terms.95 Second, and more importantly, accession to the FFP meant that the growers would 
need to share power with workers, a state of affairs to which they were unaccustomed. In the early days 
of the CIW’s struggle, in response to a request for a wage increase, a grower tellingly remarked, “The 
tractor does not tell the farmer how to run his farm.”96 This statement encapsulates how the tomato 
growers saw their workforce: as a factor of production rather than living and breathing humans with 
their own needs and desires. In 2005, the CIW marked its first victory with Yum! Restaurants joining the 
program, but it would not be until 2010 that the first grower would agree to implement the FFP.97 
 
Growers’ compliance with the FFP ultimately depended on a set of unique dynamics in the tomato 
industry field. Initially, the growers insisted that implementation was a matter for buyers to resolve with 
the CIW. The growers cited practical and legal impediments to implementing the FFP and argued that 
they could not be held responsible for the instances of slavery uncovered because growers did not 
directly employ the farm workers (workers were mostly employed through labour contractors).98 They 
remained unmoved by the demands of buyers—even an entreaty by the National Restaurants 
Association was unsuccessful. In fact, the Florida Tomato Growers Exchange (Exchange), an industry 
group made up of tomato growers in Florida, threatened its members with US$100,000 fines if they 
cooperated with the CIW.99 The continued revelations regarding forced labour on Florida’s fields, 
however, changed the calculus for the growers. On 20 December 2008, an article in the Fort Meyer 
News named the two largest tomato growers in Florida, Six L’s (now Lipmans Produce) and Pacific 
Tomato Growers, as direct beneficiaries of labour trafficking.100 In 2010, Publix, Florida’s largest grocery 
chain, refused to purchase tomatoes from Florida until it could be assured that slaves did not pick their 
tomatoes.101 This proved to be the turning point which split the united front of the growers. Shortly 
after, Pacific Tomato Growers left the Exchange and agreed to implement the FFP. A few weeks later, Six 
L’S signed. In late 2010, the Exchange surrendered and entered into an agreement with the CIW, which 
extended the protections to include a complaint resolution process, workplace health and safety 
Committees, and a process for educating farmworkers on their rights under the Code of Conduct.102 As a 
result of this agreement, the Code of Conduct has been in place since the 2011-2012 growing season. 
                                                 
95 For example, Pacific Tomato Growers reported that the company spent $5,000 on shade tents, and $50,000 for an improved 
drinking water system, in addition to wage costs for the time spent on waiting (which was previously unpaid)—Greenhouse, ‘In 
Florida Tomato Fields, a Penny Buys Progress’ (n 12).  
96 Testimony of Benitez, Co-Founder of the Coalition of the Immokalee Workers, at the Hearing of the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions, ‘Examining Ending Abuses and Improving Working Conditions for Tomato Workers’, Senate 
Hearing 110-889 (15 April 2008).  
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F. A new labour relations paradigm 
 
The CIW’s proposal for reforming the labour relations field ultimately triumphed, overtaking the 
MFJP’s more limited vision of strategic employment litigation to assist the migrant farm worker 
community. The CIW did not implement its vision because it suddenly became a dominant player in the 
labour relations field, able to wield its power to compel other parties to agree to its demands. Nor did 
the CIW manage to influence state institutions to enact new laws, and therefore, utilize the coercive 
power of law to change the behaviour of parties on farms. Instead, the CIW had to employ a softer kind 
of power “to induce cooperation by appealing to and helping create shared meanings and collective 
identities.”103 One of the key ways in which the CIW was able to do this was by amassing “symbolic 
capital”, a term Pierre Bourdieu used to describe the reputation and prestige of actors,104 which it then 
deployed to convince other parties to follow its vision.  
 
The CIW gained symbolic capital primarily through its anti-trafficking work. This provides a useful 
way to understand how an organization lacking in the usual accoutrements of power—wealth and 
connections to powerful actors—can nevertheless convince others to follow its path. Symbolic capital, 
like other forms of capital in Bourdieu’s conception, can be gained and lost—it is a quantity that is 
accretive, relational, and above all else, persuasive. When the CIW was organizing work stoppages and 
hunger strikes in its early days, it did not possess much in the way of symbolic capital. However, its 
stature grew through its participation in trafficking prosecutions throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Part 
of the reason for this was that participation in formal state processes, like the court actions, conferred a 
measure of legitimacy and authority, which other actors began to notice. In recognition of the CIW’s 
important role in the anti-trafficking field, it received numerous awards, including Germino being 
recognised by the US State Department as a “Trafficking in Persons Hero.”105 On the occasion of the CIW 
receiving the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Centre for Human Rights Award in 2003, the Palm Beach Post 
observed that the award recognized the CIW’s “growing national impact.”106 Simply put, the CIW’s 
growing prestige was a key dynamic in how it managed to convince other labour relations actors to 
implement its vision of justice on farms. The extent to which the CIW’s vision has taken hold today in the 
labour relations field is summed in a revealing quip made Gerardo Chavez, another founder of the CIW: 
“we are the new department of labour.”107 
 
IV. UNCOVERING THE ROLE OF LAW  
 
The CIW’s pursuit of improved working standards for Florida’s tomato farm workers has primarily 
been a political struggle. Finding little support for new laws or better enforcement among state 
institutions, the CIW politically campaigned for a private regulatory system to govern working 
conditions. However, at key points in the CIW’s struggle, the law proved to be a crucial resource. The 
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above analysis has traced how the CIW participated in legal processes and drew on legal discourses in 
the various, overlapping fields in which it was involved. This is a story that often does not get told with 
respect to the CIW. This does not mean that the law accounts for all of the CIW’s successes. Other 
factors were clearly in play. For example, it is no coincidence that the CIW’s campaign for the FFP took 
flight at the same time that the anti-globalization movement started to focus attention on multinational 
corporations as sources of human rights abuse, “adbusting” began to heighten our awareness of the 
perils of unbridled consumption, and Naomi Klein’s “No Logo”—perhaps the zeitgeist of the era—
exhorted people to put away their credit cards and pick up placards instead.108 However, we should not 
be too quick to ignore the role of law, even if it is only the symbolic and discursive power of the law that 
should concern us. 
 
For the CIW, the law proved to be an important resource that it could use in its struggle for fair 
working conditions. Events in the anti-trafficking field, in which the CIW was a key participant, proved 
vital in several respects. At one level, the increased attention on anti-trafficking at the international and 
national levels was a political opportunity to which the CIW responded. But equally, the CIW shaped the 
direction of the anti-trafficking movement by pressuring the Department of Justice to prosecute crew 
leaders running forced labour operations. Here we have the deliberate cross-field manipulation that 
Gaston argues is so vital to how social movement actors affect change.109 Law proved to be the tool that 
allowed this manipulation. In his seminal work on the pay equity campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s, 
Michael McCann attempted to lay bare the central role played by law.110 He found that law “was a 
complex repertoire of discursive strategies and symbolic frameworks that structure ongoing social 
intercourse and meaning-making activity among citizens.”111 We can begin to disaggregate how the CIW 
drew on the discursive and symbolic power of anti-trafficking laws to frame and give authority to its 
political campaigns. 
 
First, the ongoing prosecutions of farm crew leaders in Florida throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
highlighted just how pervasive these practices were in agriculture. It also made clear the extent to which 
general labour conditions had deteriorated. For the CIW’s friends and allies in the student and church 
movements, this evidence was too compelling to ignore, and as a result, the CIW could count on the 
support of a broad cross-section of the community to press its claims. It also provided the CIW with a 
cudgel with which to bludgeon the fast food companies and supermarkets, which claimed to deplore 
forced labour while reaping its benefits. The companies, of course, had pre-existing corporate codes of 
conduct that prohibited products made with slave labour, but the CIW’s campaign posed a question that 
they could not ignore: can you prove that there is no forced labour in your supply chains?112 The 
discursive and symbolic qualities of the law were crucial in raising public consciousness, mobilizing 
support for the CIW, and putting its targets on the back foot. 
 
Second, the CIW’s participation in the prosecutions conferred a measure of prestige on a grassroots 
organization that had previously enjoyed little clout, at least in the eyes of company decision-makers 
based in glass-panelled corporate headquarters many thousands of kilometres away. If law enforcement 
                                                 
108 N Klein, No Logo (New York, Picador, 2000) 
109 Gaston, ‘Contention Across Social Fields’ (n 18) . 
110 McCann, Rights at Work (n 28). 
111 Ibid, 282. 
112 Interview with Sean Sellers, Director of Strategic Partnerships, Worker-Driven Social Responsibility Network, Sarasota, 
Florida (15 February 2018). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3543958
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT 
Will appear in Alysia Blackham, Miriam Kullmann, and Ania Zbyszewska, eds., Theorizing Labour Law in a Changing 




agencies and government lawyers were engaged in dialogue with the CIW, how could corporate 
executives continue to evade and ignore the farm worker organization? Participation in legal processes 
also gave the CIW influence to convince state labour agencies and other farm worker advocates about 
the merits of the FFP. This has resulted in a remarkable situation in Florida currently where state 
institutions openly acknowledge that the agricultural sector is mistreating farm workers in contravention 
of the law but are happy for an under-resourced civil society actor to shoulder the burden of changing 
the situation. 
 
It is necessary to sound a note of caution about drawing overly optimistic conclusions from the CIW 
story, which also has a bearing on the broader relationship between law and social movements. In the 
first instance, the law’s malleability is a two-sided coin. While the law can be utilized strategically to 
achieve broadly progressive ends, it also can work in the other direction. For example, scholars have 
pointed out how anti-trafficking laws and discourses have been deployed to obscure violent forms of 
border enforcement,113 the criminalization of sex work,114 and even to support deeply problematic forms 
of international intervention.115 Furthermore, the law in the CIW’s story is not an innocent bystander—it 
has constructed the conditions that oppress farm workers. Listing the various laws that render farm 
workers vulnerable is beyond the scope of this chapter but suffice to say that immigration rules that 
permit certain forms of entry and bar others, judicial decisions that treat workers differently depending 
on their migration status, and legal exclusions of certain industries from labour law protections, all play 
a role. The foregoing does diminish the capacity of actors to draw strategically upon the law, but it 




V. CONCLUSION: LAW’S PROMISE?  
 
In this chapter, I have provided a historical account of the CIW’s emergence as a powerful actor in 
the Florida farming sector, emphasising the role of the law. This is important because at key moments, 
the CIW drew upon the symbolic and discursive power of anti-trafficking law to press its political claims 
for governing labour relations to better protect farm workers. However, the CIW did not only passively 
respond to the legal opportunities it found—it actively created and shaped those opportunities by 
encouraging US government authorities to take labour trafficking seriously and prosecute contractors 
engaging in this deplorable conduct. The CIW’s story demonstrates that the law can be mobilized by 
workers in a variety of ways to envision and present political demands, and other labour organizations, 
both new and old, may be able to learn important lessons from it. As we have seen time and time again, 
those consigned to the margins often develop the tools for resistance that become propitious for others 
on a later day. The importance of understanding the precise relationship between new labour 
movements and the law cannot be overstated if we are to realize a world where labour has a fair stake. 
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For labour law scholars, examining how new forms of labour associations are utilizing law in their 
struggle for better working conditions invites us to think about productive ways in which our discipline 
may be able to develop. Labour law was a concession granted to insurgent labour movements in the 
early 20th century, and the political compromise that ensued created a legal framework for employers 
and workers to bargain over how the benefits of economic production were to be distributed (and to a 
more limited way, production organized).116  Unions and workers relied upon this legal framework to 
press their claims for better wages and conditions and gain more control over their working lives. The 
collapse of this system in particular sectors of the economy means that workers may need to look 
elsewhere to make meaningful improvements in their lives. It is not surprising that we have started to 
see the appearance of new forms of labour organization that draw upon alternative legal resources to 
promote workers’ welfare. This invites labour law scholars to study more broadly the laws that labour 
movements rely upon, as well as their symbolic and discursive aspects. This chapter, which adopts a 
socio-legal lens to uncover how one particularly successful new labour organization used legal 
discourses and processes to achieve its ends, contributes in a modest way to this project. 
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